Just as Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli is set to embark on his visits to China and India in September, the India-China agreement stirred controversy regarding the sovereignty of the Lipulekh pass and the areas of Limpiyadhura and Kalapani. For Nepal, it is not merely a matter of geography, but an issue of sovereignty, historical injustice, and the perception of being overlooked by its two giant neighbors. Following the China-India accord, many had suspected that Oli would cancel his visits, but the government gave them the go-ahead.
Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh areas have remained disputed for several years, and given the differences between Nepal and India, the issue is likely to persist for years to come. Nepal’s argument claiming these areas is based on the 1816 Sugauli Treaty with the British East India Company, which had set the Kali River as the border marker. Nepal maintains that the river originates at Limpiyadhura, and hence the territory east of the river is Nepali territory. Contrary to Nepal’s claims, India argues the river originates further to the east, placing Kalapani and Lipulekh in Indian territory. China has never interfered with India’s claims. Its agreement to conduct trade through Lipulekh in 2015 and now again, without Nepal’s consent, is testimony to this. After China and India reached an understanding to use the territory claimed by Nepal without Kathmandu’s consent, it only frustrated the small Himalayan nation wedged between two bigger neighbors. Interestingly, both neighbors frequently talk about respecting Nepal’s independence, but the accord on using Lipulekh clearly contradicts that rhetoric.
Also frustrating for Nepal is Indian officials’ claim. They argue that Nepal’s claim lacks a historical basis, referring to colonial-era documents and maps when Kalapani and Lipulekh were under British India control. Nepal, however, strongly believes that the Sugauli Treaty and the river’s origin firmly prove the disputed land belongs to it. Kalapani, which sits bordering Nepal, India, and China at the tri-junction, is held as a highly strategic location. Due to this, India has deployed permanent troops in this area since the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The troop deployment, however, deepens Nepali suspicion against India. Many in Nepal see this as an encroachment that persists because Kathmandu lacks leverage. Frustration in Nepal grows when China, always seen as a counterbalance to Indian pressures, agrees with India to conduct trade over Lipulekh, which lies close to the strategic area.
Trace and test
Meanwhile, changing geopolitical dynamics also fuel the controversy. India and China’s eagerness to collaborate on trade comes as both experience tensions with the United States. India, despite suffering a 50 percent tariff imposition by the US, has so far defied US pressure on Russian oil imports, and China confronts tariffs and technological restrictions from the world’s only superpower. Under these circumstances, India and China have found room to collaborate. However, they disregard Nepal’s sensitivities, illustrating how the interests of a small, weak nation get shortchanged when bigger powers conduct their agendas.
Nepal has responded to the emerging situation with restraint. The government has sent a diplomatic note to India, expressing its displeasure. There is not much hope that gestures will alter the facts on the ground. Nepal has so far dispatched eight diplomatic notes, but they have not come to fruition. Without leverage, Nepal resorts to moral arguments and international law, which have limited traction in our region’s geopolitics.
Against this backdrop, PM Oli’s visits to China and India are taking place. His task is to stand up for Nepal’s rights and obtain practical cooperation. With India, hydropower trade, cross-border infrastructure, and matters related to the trade deficit are burning issues for the tiny Himalayan nation. However, the shadow of Lipulekh hangs over it. Whether he can balance Nepal’s nationalist sentiment with diplomacy remains to be seen. In fact, the success of his visits depends on his skill in balancing these two aspects.
India seems suspicious of Oli, as his past nationalist stances, like his statements about Ayodhya and the updated map, continue to irritate the southern neighbor. New Delhi also knows its influence and popularity. If Oli moves forward on practical cooperation, India will be generous. However, the border issue still raises the temperature as it remains unresolved.
For Nepal, the Lipulekh controversy underscores the problem of being wedged between India and China. Geography, history, and economics bind Nepal more firmly to India, yet China provides a counterbalance. However, as Lipulekh shows, China will not stand up to India on Nepal’s behalf. Kathmandu needs to practice patient diplomacy while building resilience.
Expectations will be high when Oli goes to New Delhi after China. While energy, connectivity, and trade agreements are possible, they’re valuable only through implementation. Though the Lipulekh matter is likely to persist, the visit could still be valuable if it alleviates mistrust and builds toward more cooperation.
Meanwhile, India is cautious that the border dispute with Nepal also influences Nepal’s domestic politics. Oli, who rose to prominence during the 2015 Indian blockade, tied much of his political popularity at home and abroad to defending national sensitivities on territorial integrity. During his previous tenure, he issued a new political map, including Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura within Nepal’s borders. That boosted his popularity at home but worsened ties with India. As he prepares for his visits to meet Indian and Chinese leaders, Nepalis will watch his moves with bated breath: will he raise the Lipulekh issue or prioritise bilateral matters such as economic cooperation with powerful neighbors? Avoiding the territorial issue risks accusations of compromise from his people back home, and pressing too hard risks diplomatic fallout and inflaming another round of tension with India.
