As the LLDC3 (Landlocked Developing Countries) Summit convenes in Awaza, Turkmenistan this week, it is time for a frank conversation about historical responsibility and economic justice, particularly in light of the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on climate change obligations and research on so called landlocked “artificial states”.
Within the broader category of landlocked developing countries, the "Absolute Sixteens" represent the most severely disadvantaged nations—those sixteen countries are the unfortunate lot which are both in the categories of LDCs (Least Developed Countries) and LLDCs (Landlocked Developing Countries). They face both the harshest geographical constraints and the most damaging colonial legacies. These nations, primarily located in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, suffer from a perfect storm of challenges: complete landlocked status, artificial straight-line borders that cut across ethnic groups, extreme climate vulnerability, and persistent poverty resulting directly from colonial exploitation.
The Absolute Sixteens include thirteen countries in Africa (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia) and three in Asia (Afghanistan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Nepal). These nations now face development indicators that rank among the lowest globally, with per capita incomes averaging less than one-tenth of their former colonizers. Any meaningful restitution must prioritize these sixteen nations, which should receive at least 60% of the funding from our proposed LLDC Fund.
The maps of Africa, Asia, and South America that we know today were largely drawn by European powers during the colonial era with little regard for the peoples who inhabited these lands or their future economic viability. This colonial cartography has left a devastating legacy - 32 LLDCs that face perpetual economic disadvantages through no fault of their own.
A Harvard-NYU study traced Africa’s enduring instability to a ruler and a pencil. Colonial cartographers drew borders across the continent like architects sketching hallways—ignoring peoples, histories, and landscapes. The consequences of those “artificial states,” as the scholars called them, still echo today. Their study found that countries with straight-line borders (a key indicator of artificial states) perform significantly worse across multiple development metrics, with GDP per capita 37% lower in the most artificial states compared to those with more natural borders.
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The 32 LLDCs across Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America are home to approximately 570 million people who face structural disadvantages that are nearly impossible to overcome without external intervention. These disadvantages include exorbitant transit costs, with LLDCs experiencing trade costs estimated to be 30% higher than coastal countries, significantly undermining their competitiveness in global markets. Limited economic diversification is another challenge, with about 80% of LLDCs depending on primary commodities for more than 60% of their exports. Infrastructure deficits plague these nations, which suffer from inadequate transport infrastructure, missing links in regional networks, and insufficient digital connectivity. Finally, despite contributing minimally to global emissions, LLDCs are disproportionately vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change and natural disasters.
As a result, today LLDCs face four intersecting crises: trade isolation, where LLDCs lose 1-2% of GDP annually to transit fees and delays (e.g., Zambia pays $5,000 per truck in border delays exporting copper); commodity dependence, with 80% relying on raw exports, leaving them vulnerable to price shocks (Chad’s oil revenues plummeting 60% in 2020); climate injustice, as they endure worsening droughts and floods despite minimal emissions (Niger facing recurrent crop failures); and debt traps, ensnared in odious debt from corrupt post-colonial regimes (Congo spending 44% of revenue servicing loans for failed projects). Adding value is prohibitively costly—Uganda’s coffee exporters pay 30% more in logistics than Ethiopian rivals, while Laos’ hydropower exports shrink by 15% due to middlemen from neighbouring country—locking them in raw-material traps.
The recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on climate change has fundamentally altered the legal landscape regarding historical responsibility and climate justice. The opinion establishes several key principles that directly apply to the situation of LLDCs. First, the historical responsibility principle affirms that countries bear differentiated responsibilities based on their historical contributions to environmental harm. Second, the transboundary harm doctrine reinforces that states have a legal obligation to prevent activities within their jurisdiction from causing environmental harm to other states. Third, the principle of intergenerational equity recognizes that present generations have obligations to future generations. Finally, the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities emphasizes that developed nations, particularly those with colonial histories, must take the lead in providing financial resources to vulnerable nations.
We recognize the delicate position of UN agencies like the Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UNOHRLLS). It is undoubtedly challenging to advocate positions that might discomfort major donors who are former colonial powers. However, diplomatic caution should not prevent acknowledging historical truths and exploring innovative solutions at a challenging time when SDG 2030 is way off the track.
Our proposal for the Absolute Sixteens framework, despite its evidence-based approach, has yet to receive proper acknowledgment from OHRLLS. We hope to see the kind of bold, substantive leadership recently demonstrated by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), whose outcome document, the Sevila Commitment, showed more depth and practical solutions than what we have seen in the preliminary LLDC3 outcome document. There are indications that some former colonies that have achieved economic success might themselves initiate or contribute to such a fund. OHRLLS has an opportunity to facilitate this conversation rather than avoid it, creating space for multilateral solutions that do not rely exclusively on traditional donor nations.
We propose the establishment of a dedicated LLDC Fund financed by former colonial powers in proportion to their historical colonial presence and current economic capacity. This is not charity but restitution for historical wrongs that continue to shape modern economic realities—a position now supported by the ICJ's advisory opinion on climate obligations. The Fund would allocate resources according to a priority structure that directs 60% to the Absolute Sixteens, ensuring the most disadvantaged nations receive proportionally greater support; 30% to other LLDCs, supporting the remaining landlocked developing countries; and 10% to administrative costs and research, ensuring effective implementation and continuous improvement.
The Fund would focus on infrastructure development, building and maintaining transport corridors connecting LLDCs to ports. It would support trade facilitation by simplifying customs procedures and developing efficient transit systems. Economic diversification would be promoted, helping LLDCs move up value chains. And climate resilience would be enhanced through funding adaptation measures to address LLDCs' disproportionate vulnerability to climate change.
This is not merely a moral argument but an economic and legal one. Investing in LLDCs creates new markets and opportunities that benefit the global economy, including former colonial powers. The ICJ advisory opinion transforms moral obligations into legal ones, establishing that former colonial powers have specific legal obligations to address the ongoing impacts of their historical actions. By addressing structural disadvantages faced by LLDCs, particularly the Absolute Sixteens, we unlock potential markets for goods and services, reduce migration pressures, enhance global stability, and create a more equitable global economic system that benefits everyone.
The Awaza Conference presented a historic opportunity to address a colonial legacy that continues to undermine development for half a billion people worldwide. Former colonial powers must acknowledge their historical responsibility in creating the geographical disadvantages that LLDCs continue to face. The proposed LLDC Fund, with its focus on the Absolute Sixteens, would be a concrete step toward correcting historical injustices while creating practical solutions for contemporary challenges.
The time for acknowledgment without action has passed. The establishment of an LLDC Fund is not only just—it is legally required under emerging principles of international law as articulated by the ICJ. The path forward is clear. The legal framework is established. The LLDC3 Conference offers an opportunity to choose the path of justice, reconciliation, and shared prosperity, beginning with those who need it most—the Absolute Sixteens.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in this piece are entirely the author's own and do not reflect those of any organization or country he is affiliated with. He writes solely in a personal capacity—as someone who hopes to leave behind a world more just and humane than the one we inherited.
