When the same party’s grip controls the lower house and ripples through the upper house and the presidency, democracy suffocates—and autocratic party politics tighten the chains. The tragic losses of life and infrastructure on the 7th and 8th, together with the push for constitutional reforms, may be seen as part of a “constructive destruction”—painful yet necessary shocks that can set society on a new path.
Shackled Politics
Nepal’s constitution is shackled by the parties, suffocating the separation of powers and killing the very essence of democracy. Once people cast their votes at the lower level, that same majority preference ripples upward—deciding the upper house and even the presidency. What should have been three independent checks on power has collapsed into a single-party monopoly. Instead of a balanced system with responsive feedback loops, Nepal is left with a stalled, party-hijacked structure so suffocating that only a violent uprising could shake it. With this lesson fresh, I argue for reforms to break these chains—most urgently, the direct election of the presidency and the upper house—so that three truly independent political entities can act as checks and balances on one another, our best safeguard against future upheavals.
A directly elected president would not have remained silent through the carnage of September 8th and 9th. The current president owes his seat to a collusive power-sharing deal between the NC and UML—an allocation game that, as many perceive it, has stripped the office of its independence. Hence my argument for a directly elected president.
Add to this the autocratic and undemocratic functioning of internal party politics, and the result is a completely shackled political system—one that urgently needs reform through constitutional provisions.
Elite Overproduction
Nepal’s recent Gen Z uprising and the consequential events of September 8th and 9th reflect deep-seated frustration and pent-up anger among the youth—frustration that can be traced back to the very design of the constitution. The problem is not a matter of one clause or amendment; it is the structural failure of a party-centric, collusive framework that channels energy into producing political elites while doing little else.
Let us not forget that the overproduction of elites contributed to the collapse of the Rana autocracy, and how the same pattern evolved under democratic rule, leaving the country perpetually teetering on the verge of collapse. In this article, I argue that Nepal’s current economic stagnation, chaotic governance, and recurring mass upheavals—including the recent Gen Z movement in September—stem directly from the constitution itself, a pro-party framework that has led to the overproduction of political elites. To curb this elite overproduction, I offer a set of constitutional amendments.
The Lopsided Ratio
A quick search shows Nepal has around 7,000 registered businesses (excluding the informal sector). In stark contrast, there are more than 30,000 political seats across the central, provincial, and local levels, and roughly 5 million political cadres.
This imbalance is no accident—it is the byproduct of a constitution that prioritizes political parties over citizens. Reform is necessary to bring parties under constitutional discipline, requiring them to follow democratic norms rather than operate as private clubs for the elite.
If this course continues unchanged, another uprising may not be far off.
A Comparative Reflection
Consider Vietnam: nearly 65,000 firms entered the market in the first five months of 2024 alone—the highest ever—representing a 4.5% year-on-year growth rate. While Vietnam celebrates this surge in entrepreneurship, Nepal’s leaders—Oli, Deuba, and Prachanda—compete instead to boast about swelling the ranks of political cadres. Even the newcomer RSP has fallen into the same trap with its signature campaign.
Elsewhere, Malaysia reported over 1.5 million companies and more than 9.3 million businesses by the end of 2024, while Cambodia is approaching 100,000 registered enterprises.
Nepal’s Collusive Political Structure
Nepal’s central problem lies in its collusive political structure—producing a glut of politicians and elites while starving the country of entrepreneurs. This imbalance stifles growth and keeps the system focused on political maneuvering rather than business innovation.
Instead of embracing Lincoln’s democratic vision of “government of the people, by the people, for the people,” Nepal’s constitution entrenches a system “of the parties, by the parties, for the parties.”
Parties collude to capture all three branches of power:
• Party presidents handpick candidates for both direct and proportional seats in the lower house.
• The upper house is carved up by party quotas, sidelining voters entirely.
• Parties then bargain over the presidency, parliamentary speakers, anti-corruption bodies, the judiciary, law enforcement, universities, and more.
• Party bosses run their organizations outside democratic norms, where dissent is not tolerated and collective opinions are either overshadowed or vetoed outright by the leadership. A case in point is the confession of the General Secretaries of the NC: their appeal—along with those of others—to withdraw support from the coalition after the killing of around twenty youths on September 7th was ignored by the party president, leading to even more violence and destruction the following day. Many now speculate that a more democratic decision-making process might have led to a different outcome.
• Outside their political governing units at the central, provincial, and local levels, parties have penetrated nearly every sector of Nepal’s socio-economic life through unions—education, health, advocacy, forestry, security, and bureaucracy, to name just a few. These cadres, numbering in the millions, are mobilized during elections and deployed as shows of force on the streets. Maintaining these organizations and their armies of cadres is sustained through budgetary allocations, contracts, and lucrative posts and appointments. This has effectively transformed all levels of Nepal’s administrative structure into a giant corruption machine, with graft flowing seamlessly through the hierarchy.
What we have is a political marketplace enterprise disguised as a constitution—one that mass-produces rent-seeking elites while producing few entrepreneurs. This explains why countries like Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam—once peers—have surged ahead, while Nepal remains stuck with mass outmigration, idle land, revolving governments, uninvestigated scandals, and periodic uprisings.
Proposed Reforms
A set of propositions is presented below to underscore the importance of breaking the party tentacles that thread across different branches of government—contrary to what a liberal democracy warrants:
• Direct election of the President to free the office from party horse-trading, ensuring it serves the national interest rather than partisan politics.
• Direct election of upper house members to break lower house dominance and party quota allocation, thereby ensuring the people’s direct preference.
• Primaries for all candidates, both direct and proportional, ending the ticket-allocation monopoly of party bosses.
• Checks on power of the Prime Minister and President, if and when needed, through dual impeachment thresholds (simple majority in the lower house, two-thirds in the upper house).
• Separation of powers by barring MPs from holding cabinet posts, reducing collusion and corruption.
• Term limits for both the President and Prime Minister, capped at a maximum of two terms, to curb elite overproduction.
• Ban on coalition governments between the two largest parties, ensuring a viable opposition.
• Internal democracy mandated by the constitution, as seen in countries like Germany, Spain, and South Africa.
The President vs. Prime Minister Debate
Some argue for a directly elected executive Prime Minister—a proposal worth considering. My own focus, however, is on freeing the President, upper house, and lower house from the manipulative grip of party leaders, while embedding constitutional provisions that require internal party democracy.
Addressing Elite Overproduction
A decentralized system of independent institutions—the President, upper house, and lower house—would allow the government to focus on delivery, development, and citizen needs. Elite overproduction would decline, while entrepreneurs and engineers could finally flourish, as seen in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia.
The theory of elite overproduction explains this clearly: when a society produces too many political elites relative to opportunities, corruption thrives, entrepreneurship withers, and instability follows. Nepal’s recent Gen Z uprising—just as I warned months ago—is the predictable result. Without reform, it will not be the last.