The transition Nepal is facing poses considerable challenges. Prime Minister Sushila Karki and her government will prioritize holding elections, strengthening accountability, and tackling corruption. Yet it is important to remember that foreign policy never pauses, and Nepal will soon need to reassert its interests in the international arena.
It is worth reflecting on some of the foreign policy moves taken by the previous government. This raises a crucial question:
Did former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, during his recent trip to China, make the right choices in meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin and, only days later, attending a large military parade in Beijing that humiliated Japan?
My answer is simple: “no” on both counts. But let me explain why.
Nepal, as a country without extensive bilateral ties beyond its immediate neighborhood, should never miss opportunities to expand its outreach and cultivate relationships with other nations—especially at a time of major global geopolitical shifts. Forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or BRICS could provide Kathmandu with valuable platforms to network with major powers.
In this sense, former Prime Minister Oli was right to attend the SCO summit in Tianjin at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Chinese leader used the occasion to promote his vision of a “Global South” led by China, framing it as an alternative model of multilateralism. In the past, Beijing has introduced initiatives like the Global Civilization Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, which, despite gaining some positive responses from developing countries—including Nepal—have yet to gain significant traction.
At the SCO meeting, President Xi announced another new framework, the Global Governance Initiative (GGI). While details remain unclear, it seems more aspirational than practical. For now, it lacks any concrete implementation mechanism. The GGI does not radically challenge the liberal international order based on universal freedoms and human rights but instead seeks to slowly reshape it from Beijing’s perspective. The initiative emphasizes principles such as “sovereign equality” and “true multilateralism”—worthy ideas, but not revolutionary ones.
China’s approach appears to be a gradual erosion of the existing system, offering developing nations an alternative order rooted in multipolarity, with Beijing as the guarantor. For many in the Global South, frustrated with the West, this vision may seem appealing. Nepal should remain open to a more inclusive world order, but it must carefully assess the real implications of such a shift, ensuring that national interests and democratic values are not compromised. Indeed, Kathmandu has so far navigated this challenge wisely—for example, by rejecting references to Nepal as part of Beijing’s Global Security Initiative, another pillar of China’s new world order narrative.
Turning to Oli’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin: until its invasion of Ukraine, Russia too sought to reset the world order alongside China. But its war on Ukraine fundamentally altered its standing, making Moscow an aggressor and stripping it of international legitimacy. Nepal has consistently taken the moral high ground, condemning Russia’s invasion in line with UN principles. Ukraine, as an independent nation, has the right to make its own strategic choices. Russia had diplomatic avenues available, but its decision to launch a war placed it firmly on the wrong side of history.
In this context, Oli’s meeting with Putin was unwise. It effectively opened the door for Putin to “invite himself” to Nepal during next year’s commemoration of 70 years of Nepal–Russia relations. Yet Nepal is a member of the International Criminal Court, which has issued an arrest warrant for Putin over alleged war crimes related to the deportation of Ukrainian children. If Putin were to visit Nepal, how would Kathmandu reconcile its obligations to the ICC with diplomatic protocol? Even stronger countries like Brazil have avoided this dilemma by resisting Putin’s participation in summits.
Finally, Oli’s decision to attend Beijing’s military parade marking the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II was also a mistake. Japan, a long-standing and generous development partner of Nepal, had urged friendly nations to avoid the event. The parade was widely seen not as an act of reconciliation but as a symbolic humiliation of Tokyo. For Nepal, participation in such a display risked undermining its valuable relationship with Japan.
Nepal is right to seek a more inclusive and multipolar world order that better reflects the aspirations of developing nations. But it must also remain cautious not to be drawn—willingly or otherwise—into geopolitical frameworks that serve primarily the ambitions of China and Russia. These powers speak of peace and justice but maintain some of the world’s most powerful militaries and have not hesitated to use them.
For the Karki government, foreign affairs may not be the central priority, as Nepal urgently needs to strengthen its democracy. Yet the country must continue to uphold an independent, values-based foreign policy anchored in the UN Charter. By engaging in good faith with all nations, safeguarding its own interests, and remaining true to its democratic traditions, Nepal can navigate the shifting global landscape without losing its moral compass.